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 Abstract 
 
 
This research examines the role that Islamic ideology plays in Pakistani politics at the 
national and sub-national levels. It seeks to understand how Islamic parties appeal to Islam to 
garner support. I pull from and contribute largely to the theoretical literature on nationalism and 
apply it specifically to my research question. I argue that political leaders rely on Islamic rhetoric 
more heavily at the national level to create a national identity. However, my research will also 
show that this phenomena is less prominent in sub-national politics. At the provincial level, 
political parties and party leaders are more likely to engage their constituents by using rhetoric 
that speaks to their ethnic identity and promises access to essential resources. To provide 
evidence for this argument, a corpus analysis was chosen to investigate news articles, interviews, 
and quotes from Islamic political leaders at the sub-national and national levels, specifically 
political leaders from the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. The main result from this 
research is that Islamic rhetoric is used differently at the two levels. Thus, these results 
contribute to a better understanding of what motivates Islamic political parties in Pakistan and 
whether or not they are meaningfully distinct from other, more secular, political parties in 
Pakistan.  
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Introduction 
 
 This thesis examines the role that Islamic ideology plays in Pakistani politics by 
analyzing how two political parties use Islamic rhetoric at both the national and sub-national 
levels. To provide a better understanding of how the two are connected in modern day Pakistan, I 
will provide a recent example.  At the end of November, 2017 there were widespread protests in 
Pakistan calling for the current Law Minister, Zahid Hamid, to resign after suggesting 
amendments to the current blasphemy laws that would no longer require government officials to 
mention the Prophet Mohammed during oaths for office.1 Khadim Hussain Rizvi, a Muslim 
preacher and founder of an Islamist political party, captured his party’s reaction to this event by 
stating, “we will die to protect the honor of the prophet.”2 This event led to several weeks of 
protests against the government by a hardline cleric and resulted in the official resignation of 
Zahid Hamid.3 This illustrates how strong of a connection there is between Islam and the 
Government in Pakistan and why all Pakistani political parties appeal to Islam at the national 
level. However, this is only one example. To explain this connection further, one must examine 
Pakistan’s beginnings as well as its history with colonialism. This situation also begs the 
questions: how and why has Islam stood the test of time? Is it because of Pakistan’s ideological 
commitments or a calculated political strategy? It is important to understand these motivations, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sophia Saifi, Chieu Luu, and Susannah Cullinane, “As Street Tensions Simmer, Pakistani Law Minister 
Apologizes to Protesters,” CNN, last modified November 29, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/26/asia/pakistan-
protests-paramilitary/index.html. 
2 “Thousands Of Islamic Protesters Block Islamabad Streets, Demand Minister’s Removal,” 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, last modified November 11, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/thousands-islamic-
protesters-block-islamabad-streets-demand-minister-hamid-removal/28847788.html. 
3 Sophia Saifi, “Pakistan Law Minister Resigns; Blasphemy Protests Disperse,” CNN, last modified November 27, 
2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/26/asia/pakistan-law-minister-resigns/index.html. 
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because it helps us examine how Pakistan creates its policies as well as discover the most 
powerful issues/interest groups that drive the Pakistani Government.  
 My thesis takes one aspect of the Pakistani political system, its construction of a national 
identity, and tries to break it apart to understand its complexities. Specifically, it builds on 
current literature on nationalism, ethnic groups, and provincialism. From there, it bridges the gap 
in the literature by analyzing how Islamic rhetoric is used differently at the national versus sub-
national level. To accomplish this, I will first discuss relevant literature to provide context and to 
situate my research within the existing scholarship. From there, I will establish my argument that 
Islamic rhetoric is used to create a national identity in Pakistan, but does not effectively permeate 
into Pakistan’s provinces. To make this claim, I will use both linguistic and political science 
methodology to collect data and analyze my results. Finally, I will discuss the implications of 
this research as well as areas for continued discussion.  
Review of Scholarship 
 
In this section, I will analyze literature focusing on the relationship between Islam and 
Pakistan’s political system.  Specifically, I will examine scholarship covering two categories: 
nationalism and Islamic parties. The first topic will be nationalism and the concept of a national 
identity. This will help to answer the major question of my thesis: why is there a difference 
between Islamic rhetoric at the national and sub-national levels? Scholarship on nationalism in 
this thesis includes: how a nation is defined, historical nationalism in Pakistan, and then finally 
ethnic nationalism. Islamic parties, the second topic in this section, are used as a case study in 
this thesis because of their self-purported commitment to Islam. Islamic party literature focuses 
on providing definitions for political Islam, Islamic party history, as well as arguments for how 
	   Chafin 3 
Pakistan’s Islamic political parties should be classified. From this literature, as well as my own 
data and analysis, this thesis will bridge the gap between the national and sub-national levels in 
Pakistan by providing comparative analysis that does not yet exist in the literature about how 
Islam is used differently by political parties at the two governmental levels.  
Nationalism	   	  	   	  
Definitions 	  
 Ernest Gellner provides one of the first theoretical frameworks for understanding 
nationalism.4 The following passage from Gellner provides a definition of nationalism, which is  
relied on in this thesis:  
Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations 
where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work 
on, even if, as indicated, these are purely negative (i.e. consist of disqualifying marks 
from entry to privilege, without any positive similarity between those who share the 
disqualification and who are destined to form a new ‘nation’).5 
 
Gellner provides more insight and argues that nationalism is not “natural”, or necessarily 
inherent in society.6 In this quote, Gellner details the idea of “negative nationalism.”7 Tudor 
expands on this concept by explaining that a “negative” national identity is one that is created out 
of opposition to something, instead of something more common among groups that comes from 
within them and their shared identity/history.8 I will use this idea of “negative nationalism” to 
measure the success of Pakistan’s national identity today (whether or not the national identity 
permeates down to the sub-national level), and whether it is still defined negatively or not. To do 
this, I will compile evidence on the amount of Islamic rhetoric used by political leaders at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 147-178. 
5 Ibid, 168. 
6 Ibid, 152.  
7 Ibid, 168. 
8 Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 94.  
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national and sub-national levels. This will illustrate how a national identity is implemented in 
Pakistan, as well as whether or not it extends into the provinces, which would be one measure of 
success.    
While Gellner’s quote detailed the “spirit” of nationalism, Anthony Smith provides more 
specific definitions and commentary on  “nation” and “nationalism.”9 For Smith, “a nation is a 
named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass 
education system and common legal rights.”10 While, he defines “nationalism as an ideological 
movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity and identity of an existing or 
potential ‘nation’.”11 These are important to note because Christophe Jaffrelot specifically 
applies Gellner’s “spirit” of nationalism to the Pakistani context.12 Jaffrelot argues that Pakistan 
is not a nation, because a nation cannot have multiple “nationalities” within it.13 Jaffrelot 
continues to discuss the different nationalities and ethnic groups within Pakistan, which creates 
room to argue that because there are distinct differences between Pakistan’s provinces, these 
differences inherently create a divide between the national and sub-national levels in Pakistan.14 
Thus, the Pakistani Government has to represent multiple ethnic groups with different languages, 
different interpretations of Islam, different cultural traditions, as well as minority groups who do 
not practice Islam.15 Because of these differences, national level politicians have to focus on how 
to create a sense of nationalism within the country, without a nation in place. Provincial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Anthony Smith,  “The Origins of Nations,” in Becoming National: A Reader, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 106-130. 
10 Ibid, 107. 
11 Ibid, 108. For further discussion on nationalism, see Ernest Renan,  “What Is a Nation?” in Becoming National: A 
Reader, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 42-55.  
12 Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New 
Delhi  : London  ; New York: Manohar; Centre de Sciences Humaines  ; Zed Books  ; Distributed in the USA 
exclusively by Palgrave, 2002), 10-11. 
13 Ibid, 7-8. This idea is known as “two nation theory” and will be discussed later on in the paper, under theoretical 
framework. 
14 Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, 16-32. 
15 Ibid.  
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politicians, on the other hand, can instead focus on their specific ethnic demographics and 
relaying proper social services.  
To understand how a national identity is formed, it is important to discuss the individual 
components of one. For author David Laitin, language is the most critical component of a 
national identity and is one of the easiest identifiers of a group.16 Jaffrelot applies this to the 
Pakistani case and argues that the Government had to turn “Islam” and “Urdu” into “symbols of 
dominion,” to create a national identity for Pakistan.17  In 1981, only 7.6% of citizens in Pakistan 
actually spoke Urdu.18 Tariq Rahman agrees with Jaffrelot and states, “ it is Urdu that the ruling 
elites of Pakistan have supported and the ethnic nationalities have never accepted.”19 Therefore, 
just as Urdu is mainly used at the national level to unify the provinces, I argue that the same can 
be said for Islam. 
The explanatory power of nationalism within the Pakistani context has been strongly 
debated.  Saadia Toor argues that nationalism should not be used to explain the problems of 
Pakistan today.20 While Toor’s argument may be correct, it does not allow for the idea that the 
power of nationalism may actually lie in understanding the differences between Pakistan and 
other nations, and even the differences within the country itself. These are not necessarily 
“problems” that Pakistan faces as Toor would define, but instead “differences” that are in part 
explained by nationalism and the creation of an identity in Pakistan. Maya Tudor explains one of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), 22, https://quod-lib-umich-edu.proxy.wm.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-
idx?cc=acls;c=acls;idno=heb32407.0001.001;node=heb32407.0001.001%3A4.1;rgn=div1;view=image;page=root;se
q=36. 
17 Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, 15-16.  
18 Tariq Rahman,  “Language and Politics in a Pakistan Province: The Sindhi Language Movement,” Asian Survey 
35, no. 11 (1995): 1006, accessed April 15, 2018, https://doi.org/10.2307/2645724. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Saadia Toor, The State of Islam  : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 2,  
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,url,shib&db=nlebk&AN=378673&site=eh
ost-live&scope=site. 
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these differences when she argues that the different trajectories of Pakistan and India can be 
explained in part by their differing national identities.21 My thesis adds to this scholarship by 
detailing how nationalism can explain the “differences” in the use of Islamic rhetoric by political 
leaders at the national and sub-national levels in Pakistan. Rhetoric is not a “problem,” but 
instead a bi-product of the type of nationalism created in Pakistan. Thus, the rest of this section 
will build on the importance of nationalism within the Pakistani context by examining Islamic 
nationalism during important points in Pakistan’s history, as well as exploring ethnic 
nationalism.   
Nationalism and Pakistan’s History 	   	  
In this section I outline “critical junctures” in Pakistan’s tumultuous history to detail 
important moments in shaping Pakistan’s national identity. Paul Pierson explains that “junctions 
are “critical” because they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are 
then very difficult to alter.”22  I argue that the specific “junctures” that have impacted Pakistan’s 
national identity include: 1947 partition, Ayub Khan’s term, the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation 
War, and Zia al Haq’s Islamization in the wake of the 1971 war and partition of the country.   
These moments are turning points in Pakistan’s history, which determined and revised the 
concept of Pakistan’s national identity.  
Partition 	  
The first “critical juncture” for Pakistan’s national identity are the years directly leading 
to the 1947 partition of India into Pakistan and India. With the advent of a new country, there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan, 86-99. 
22 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time  : History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 135,  
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.wm.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzM5MDUxOV9fQU41?sid=e972f
667-4dbc-4276-8cc7-e48688d674fd@sessionmgr4009&vid=0&format=EB&rid=1. 
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was an opportunity to construct a new “Muslim” identity that could be separate from Hindus and 
the British. An important leader in creating this identity was Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was 
the leader of the Muslim League during partition.23 The Muslim League was a political party 
formed to fight for the rights of the Muslim minority in Pakistan.24  
One of the most important years leading up to partition for the Muslim League was 1937. 
Authors Jalal and Tudor mark the 1937 provincial elections as a wake-up call for Jinnah, as the 
Muslim League was not able to establish a stronghold of support.25 However, this defeat turned 
out to be fortuitous because it made the Muslim majority provinces look to Jinnah to preserve 
their autonomy.26 The provinces saw that the Indian National Congress wanted to create a more 
centralized India post-independence, and feared that the Congress would be able to do so 
because of their recent electoral success.27  Each province’s commitment to autonomy at all costs 
gives credence to the idea that the only identity shared among these provinces was their desire to 
be independent. Jinnah understood this and used it as a way to garner support for the Muslim 
League and their agenda.28 Jinnah found success with this political strategy in the 1945/1946 
elections when the Muslim League won significant Muslim seats in both the central and 
provincial legislatures.29 But, the question remains, how was Jinnah going to be able to unite 
groups who fundamentally wanted to be independent? Jinnah was a not very religious and some 
categorize him as a “secular Muslim.”30 However, Jalal explains that Jinnah was able to unite the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 165.  
24 Ibid, 161.  
25 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 33-34; Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India 
and Autocracy in Pakistan, 92-94. 
26 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan, 33-34.  
27 Ibid, 33.  
28 Ibid, 33-34. 
29 Barbara Daly Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, 212-213.  
30 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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provinces via political Islam when she states: “use of the communal factor was a political tactic, 
not an ideological commitment.”31 Jinnah used the idea that Islam was at risk to superficially 
unite these provinces, which is seen explicitly in the fact that the Muslim League started to use 
“Islamic slogans a year before independence”.32 However, once independence was achieved, the 
unity that a common loyalty to provincial autonomy brought was over. During the aftermath of 
partition, “the Muslim League had increasingly turned towards the discourse of “Islam” to quash 
dissent and to try to cobble together legitimacy for itself.”33 This use of Islam has remained in 
Pakistan and this thesis will examine how the national Government relies on it to create a 
national identity.  
Barbara and Thomas Metcalf also discuss specific details about the events leading up to 
partition and its aftermath.34 One of their main arguments is that the British sped up 
independence and the partition of India in order for them to be able to shift their focus to their 
own reconstruction post World War II.35 The two authors argue that because of this, post-
colonial institutions could not be as easily set up.36 In addition to the timing issue with partition, 
Barbara and Thomas Metcalf also explain that the struggle over Kashmir posed a major threat to 
post-independence stability for Pakistan and India.37 Kashmir was a Muslim majority state with a 
Hindu ruler, and could have feasibly become a part of either India or Pakistan.38 Kashmir is still 
a highly contested issue between Pakistan and India, and because of this conflict, the national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1996), 41, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy.wm.edu/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzE2OTY1Nl9fQU41?sid=d2ebc90
0-1363-46c9-ade2-9d7ca23ad871@sessionmgr4009&vid=0&format=EB&rid=1. 
31 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan, 5.  
32 Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan, 98. 
33 Saadia Toor, The State of Islam  : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan, 94.  
34 Barbara Daly Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India.  
35 Ibid, 220.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid, 224-225.  
38 Ibid.  
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identities of both countries are called into question.39 For Pakistan, part of its identity is the fact 
that it is a “Muslim homeland”, but this identity becomes fragile when major portions of South 
Asian Muslims are not part of the country.40 From the very beginning of Pakistan, the national 
level had to use Islam to create a sense of nationalism for the country, and this thesis will 
examine if this is still the case.  
Ayub Khan 	  
The next critical juncture came with Ayub Khan’s transition into power at the national 
level. It provides a salient example of how autonomy and differences between the provinces 
continuously plague Pakistan’s national unity. These differences became extremely apparent in 
1954, when there was significant debate about whether or not there should be just one Pakistan, 
without provincial boundaries.41 The idea behind this change was that the deep sense of 
provincialism within Pakistan’s national story was a detriment to national integration.42 This 
created great instability within the country, so much so that general Ayub Khan was able to 
easily and successfully implement a coup for power.43 Bloodshed and chaos ensued at the very 
idea of a loss of autonomy and because of this, we see that both provincialism and nationalism, 
which were a major part of the move for partition, were again at the forefront of debate in 
Pakistan in 1954.  
Ayub Khan came to power with a “secular agenda,” and believed that he would be able to 
decrease the national Government’s reliance on Islam now that he was in power.44 In 1962, Khan 
and his Government removed “Islamic Republic” from Pakistan’s official name in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid.   
41 Saadia Toor, The State of Islam  : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan, 80. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 81. 
44 Ibid, 94. 
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constitution.45 However, the regime received such harsh criticism that they changed it back to the 
previous constitution in the next year.46 After Khan realized that this was not feasible at the 
national level, he turned to a platform of “religious modernism.”47 In a move to consolidate 
power, Ayub Khan wanted to decrease Pakistan’s reliance on Islam and by proxy the influence 
of Islamic parties in Pakistan.48 Ayub Khan shifted his agenda and instead used Islam to his 
advantage in Pakistan, so as long as his Government was able to control Islamic interpretation.49 
This shows a perfect example of secular leaders relying on Islam and not being able to pass up 
the political advantages that Islamic rhetoric can create.   
Bengali Independence 	  
East Pakistan’s fight for independence is the next critical juncture, which heavily 
influenced Pakistan’s national identity. East Pakistan was home to the Bengali ethnic group.50 
However, its inability to fit into the idea of Pakistani nationalism was true even before partition, 
as seen from the fact that Bengal was not even represented in the conception of Pakistan’s name, 
which stood for “Punjab, the Afghan region, Sindh, Baluchistan.”51 Before independence, it was 
not decided whether India would be divided into two or three separate states, or perhaps even 
more.52 One of these states was potentially going to be an independent Bengal because its leaders 
did not want to be marginalized by Punjab.53 However, Bengal did not create its own state right 
after Pakistan’s independence; however, the issue of how to incorporate Bengal did make it very 
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difficult to create a national identity that included a province disconnected from the rest. One 
such difficulty was that there were sharp inequalities between West and East Pakistan from the 
beginning. One example is that Jinnah refused to make the national language of Pakistan 
Bengali.54 Even though “Bengalis constituted a majority of the Pakistani population,” they were 
continuously marginalized and exploited from the beginning.55 Another example of this stems 
from economic discrimination, specifically when East Pakistani exports and trade earnings were 
taken and used in West Pakistan to create a more modern and industrialized West Pakistan.56 
Even foreign aid was mainly dispersed for development projects in West Pakistan.57 Persistent 
inequality started a “move from linguistic regionalism to nationalism” in Bengal.58 This cry for 
Bengali nationalism was used in 1969 by the Student Action Committee, which was formed in 
East Pakistan and called for many reforms, most notably complete provincial autonomy.59 This 
student group started the battle for Bengali independence and galvanized the East Pakistani 
Awami League, which is a political party that formed to fight for Bengali equality and 
autonomy.60 In an effort to extinguish these riots and opposition, the national Government 
actually arrested Awami Leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), for “conspiring with India to 
undermine the unity of Pakistan.”61 In West Pakistan, the Awami League was seen as  “a 
corrosive cultural influence that diluted the glue of Islam holding Pakistan together.”62 This 
battle between parties, provinces, and national identities continued into the 1970 elections, where 
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the Awami League won the majority of seats.63 This electoral victory as well as the subsequent 
events started the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.64 This war and the subsequent independence 
of Bangladesh represent the deep loyalty to provincial autonomy that characterizes the provinces 
of Pakistan. East Pakistan was able to actually succeed in its move for independence, but we see 
similar movements in Sindh and Baluchistan, which will be examined in the ethnic nationalism 
section.65 These moves for independence show that autonomy and Islam are two threads that are 
woven throughout Pakistan’s history without exception, and the war for Bangladesh’s 
independence provides a salient example of this commitment to autonomy.  	  
Zia-al-Haq’s Islamization 	  
The fourth and final critical juncture occurred in 1977, when General Zia-al-Haq led a 
military coup to displace Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s PPP (People’s Party of Pakistan) administration.66 
Saadia Toor explains that this coup “had no legitimacy, and no real base of support” and 
therefore Zia-al-Haq had to use “Islam to legitimate authoritarianism.”67 There is a history of 
using Islam as a political tool in Pakistan, from Ayub Khan to Zia-al-Haq, however these two 
leaders used Islam very differently. Khan wanted to modernize Islam, while Zia-al-Haq called 
for a more traditional implementation.68 Even though these two leaders used Islam very 
differently, Islam has always been evoked at the national level to reduce the “arbitrariness” of 
national rule. However, Zia-al-Haq’s use of Islam actually resulted in an “increased 
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centralization of power, which inflamed the national question.”69 Yet again, Islam is not enough 
to blind people of the national Government’s encroachment of their autonomy. This time, the 
citizens of Sindh, a province in Pakistan, created uproar against Zia-al-Haq.70 Sindhis felt 
particularly called to oppose Zia-al-Haq because Bhutto was actually from Sindh.71 Therefore the 
Sindhis took issue both with Zia-al-Haq’s coup as well as his increased support of the opposing 
ethnic group in the province, the Muhajirs.72 This is an example of yet another province in 
Pakistan taking issue with the central Government and taking up arms to defend its autonomy. 
This illustrates how pervasive autonomy is in Pakistan.   
Ethnic Nationalism 	  
In this section, I will provide a background on the ethnic groups in Pakistan as well as 
examine literature that shows how important ethnic nationalism is in Pakistan’s provinces. From 
there, I will be able to argue why ethnic nationalism has made it difficult for Pakistan to adopt a 
central national identity. At partition, Pakistan was home to the Bengali, “the Baluchs, Pashtuns, 
Sindhis, Punjabis, Muhajirs.”73 Bengal was not unique in its commitment to its language and 
culture nor its quest for self-determination. Just like the Bengali, the Baluch and Sindhi ethnic 
groups in Pakistan have also fought for autonomy and wanted independence, as seen specifically 
with the impetus for “Sindhu Desh,” which is a movement for a “completely autonomous Sindhi 
homeland”.74 This section will provide information on each ethnic group and explain how ethnic 
nationalism has always been a part of Pakistani history, even before partition.   
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The Baluch ethnicity makes up the smallest population in Pakistan and has remained 
pastoral and tribal in make-up.75 The Baluch have fiercely maintained their language as a main 
aspect of their culture and it is “one of the oldest living languages.”76 The Baluch have been able 
to do this, even though their territory has been fractured by the  “British, Iranian, and Pakistani 
regimes,” at various points throughout history. 77  This shows how the Baluch and their fight for 
Baluchistan and their cultural heritage, pre-dates the formation of Pakistan. However, more 
specifically in 1973-1977, they actually fought against the Pakistani government and formed an 
insurgency.78 The fact that the Baluch people make up the smallest population in Pakistan, yet 
still rose up to fight for autonomy and their cultural heritage shows how salient ethnic 
nationalism is in Pakistan. The Sindhis are most similar to the Baluch, not necessarily in 
tradition, but in terms of their fight against central authority, and more specifically against 
Punjabi take-over.79 The Pashtuns are also an ethno-national group whose geographic homeland 
is divided between Pakistan and Afghanistan.80 However, they have not used as much violence 
against the national Government as the Sindhis or Baluch.81  
The Muhajirs are another ethnic group from the Sindh province, but are different from 
the Sindhis, the original inhabitants of Pakistan’s Sindh province.82 The Muhajirs are Muslim 
immigrants and their descendants who came from India at partition and who were often better 
educated and more skilled than Sindhis, resulting in tensions between Sindhis and Muhajirs.83 
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The Punjabis are another ethnic group, who with the Muhajirs have at various periods throughout 
Pakistan’s history made up the majority of the national Government bureaucracy.84 This is in 
part because the “British viewed Punjabis as the ethnicity that showed the most promise in the 
region.”85 Christopher Hurst explains this further by detailing how the British believed that the 
Punjabis would be able to adapt to the British style of leadership and assimilate more quickly.86 
This then led to the Punjabis being picked to play a major role in the colonial army, which 
allowed Punjabis to dominate other groups after partition because they had been taught the skills 
necessary to implement national institutions.87 Because of this, there was a “Punjabization of 
Pakistan” that set forth a competition between Punjab and the other provinces, as well as created 
a national government and identity that only really encompassed one province in Pakistan.88 
With such distinct ethnic groups in Pakistan, the obstacles with trying to create a national 
identity that unites all of them are clear. These provinces focus their energy on maintaining their 
cultural heritages, dealing with ethnic conflict, as well as fighting for autonomy. Therefore, it 
makes sense that their politicians who campaign at the provincial level would also tailor their 
campaigns and rhetoric to ethnic nationalism, instead of only “central” nationalism, i.e. Islam. 
Ayesha Jalal explains the obstacles that the national Government faces in creating a national 
identity when she states: “there has been a distinct sharpening of tensions in Pakistan’s 
remaining provinces where linguistic and cultural identities are fusing with political and 
economic grievances to short circuit the melting mechanisms of state-sponsored programmes of 
Islamization in effect since the late 1970’s.”89 These provinces already have their ethnicity and 
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cultural heritage as an identity and therefore do not need Islamic rhetoric to create a national 
identity. In fact, they fight against the formation of a national identity because it means increased 
centralization of the state and decreased autonomy. My thesis builds off of this literature and 
shows that these ethnic divides are still present and therefore still dictate how political 
representatives speak to their constituents. 
Islamic Political Parties 	  
 This section outlines the characteristics of Islamic parties in Pakistan, as well as provides 
an understanding of why and how they use Islam to achieve their political agenda. Haroon Ullah 
provides an organizational framework to understand the complexities of Islamic political 
parties.90 He notes, “while all Islamic confessional parties agree that Islamic tenets should inform 
governance, they vary tremendously in how strictly they interpret religious laws and how 
significant they believe the government’s role in enforcing those laws should be.”91 From this, he 
creates his own categories of Islamic political parties in Pakistan along what he calls the “sharia-
secularism continuum”.92 This spectrum divides the broad category of Islamic parties into two 
more distinct ones: Islamist and Muslim Democratic.93 The key distinction between the two lies 
in the level of commitment they have to implementing Islamic law and moral philosophy into the 
public sphere.94 While Muslim Democratic Parties do believe that Islam should inform some 
policy, Ullah explains that their main commitment is to economic and political issues.95 On the 
other hand, Islamist parties have “religious ideological commitments to state adoption of 	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sharia.”96 Ullah gets rid of the oversimplification and misunderstanding of religious parties in 
Pakistan by breaking them into groups and explaining how they are not all the same and do not 
practice or campaign under the same tenets.97 
 Ullah’s division of Islamic parties makes it necessary to study at least one party from 
each category: Islamist and Muslim Democratic.98 For this thesis, I chose the Jammat-e-Islami 
(JI), an Islamist party, and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s (PML-N), a Muslim 
Democratic party.99 I will examine their political candidate’s rhetoric at both the national and 
provincial levels. The  PML-N, with a stronghold in the Punjab, is also one of the only Islamic 
parties that has reached national recognition and according to Ullah is the “largest and most 
successful”.100 The JI first campaigned in the Punjab province in 1951 and therefore has a strong 
tie to the province.101 Because Islamic parties purport to have this commitment to Islamic 
ideology, it is necessary to examine their use of Islamic rhetoric at the national and sub-national 
levels first. If we see a distinction between the two levels with these parties, then it will be easier 
to make the case that this difference also exists for more secular parties in Pakistan.  
Conclusion 	  
 The above literature provides both the historical and institutional context for 
understanding how Islam has been used at the national level to try and create a unified identity 
for the country. At the sub-national level, the themes of provincialism and ethnic conflict found 
in this literature help explain the differences between provinces as well as the differences 
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between the two levels. Building on this background literature, my thesis will add another 
difference, which is how the two levels use Islamic rhetoric.  
Theoretical Framework 	  
 This section outlines the theoretical framework that my thesis builds on. Theories 
focusing specifically on Pakistan as well as broader theories on competition for votes and 
political representation also provide background. To understand the motivating factors behind 
these parties, we have to first understand what it means and what it takes to be successful in the 
political arena. These theories will then give meaning and interpretation to the results and 
evidence that I have collected, which will be outlined later in this thesis.    
Two-Nation Theory 	  
 Many authors use two-nation theory to explain why Jinnah argued for a separate 
Pakistani nation.102 Jaffrelot explains that Jinnah actually created the idea of “two-nation theory” 
and provides the following explanation:  
The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, 
and literatures […] To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a 
numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the 
final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a 
State.103 
 
This theory established a precedent for claiming independence if religious distinctions and 
“social customs” were significant.104 This theory was also used to explain the events that lead up 
to the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, where East Pakistan claimed that it was too distinct 
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from West Pakistan, and was not being represented properly.105 This called into question whether 
or not Jinnah was actually correct in using two-nation theory to argue for a separate Muslim 
homeland, because ultimately the Pakistan envisioned at partition, one including Bengal, failed. 
The commonalities that Jinnah espoused were not salient enough to keep Pakistan together. From 
there, Pakistan either has to redefine its founding or create a new national identity centered 
around issues that all modern day Pakistanis have in common. However, if this does not happen 
then two-nation theory could be used to make the claim that because each province has its own 
ethnic national identity, then they should become their own independent country. There are 
practical reasons that this has not happened since the 1971 war, one of them being that the other 
provinces do not have the support of India or another major power to help them.106 Thus, this 
thesis will build on two-nation theory and discuss its relevance to today’s political and ethnic 
climate in Pakistan.  
Political Institutionalization Theory 	   	  
 Political institutionalization theory provides a framework to judge the institutionalization 
of Islamic parties in Pakistan and if they do or do not use Islamic ideology to increase that 
institutionalization to become more “successful” parties. Samuel Huntington defines 
institutionalization as “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and 
stability.”107 He makes the case that in order for organizations, for example political parties, to 
become fully entrenched in the political system, they must have the following criteria: 
“adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence.”108 Shmuel Eisenstadt provides a different 
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set of criteria for successful institutionalization and instead argues that having a charismatic 
leader that is able to attract many social groups is most important.109 If party leaders are able to 
attract a wide array of followers, then they will also be able to extract unique resources from 
them which will make them more apt to compete against already established parties.110  
Regardless of which criteria are used, it is useful to be able to judge and categorize the 
institutionalization of the political systems and parties in Pakistan. This theory serves to provide 
a model to understand how organizations can become part of the legacy that is the political 
system in a country, and ultimately identifies what makes organizations able to stand the test of 
time.111 Huntington goes further with this institutionalization theory by describing the rural-
urban gap within politics. He states “one major test of the institutionalization of a party and the 
adaptability of its leadership is the willingness of the latter to make the concessions necessary to 
win the support of the countryside”.112 This test of institutionalization theory makes it clear that 
blind loyalty to ideology is actually seen as a hindrance to party success in the eyes of 
institutionalization theorists. Parties must be able to create alliances and compromises to remain 
relevant and in control of the political system. Huntington also stresses the importance of the 
countryside citizens in maintaining political stability for those in power, which is key to 
understanding why major national parties may or may not reach out to smaller regional or 
religious parties, such as Islamic ones, to ensure votes and their own stability.113 This provides a 
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framework to analyze the relationship between national and sub-national/religious parties in 
Pakistan and how each one might use ideology differently, knowing that a reciprocal relationship 
is necessary for survival.   
Political Ideology Theory 	  
 This section outlines why understanding a party’s ideology is important in understanding 
how a party was formed, its overall institutionalization and success in its respective political 
system. Alan Ware writes that party ideology changes are not significant, but when they do 
happen they are “prompted, primarily, by competition for votes.”114 The first part of his theory is 
important to note because it means that party ideology is not as pliable as some theorists perceive 
it to be, and instead it takes a party’s goal of institutionalization and success to supersede its 
originating ideology. Ware also states that “ the need to compete for votes can result in parties 
that had rather different origins coming to resemble each other.”115 These two ideas seem at odds 
with one another, but they do provide an important distinction for the overall framework for 
analysis in this thesis. That is the idea that ideology creates the foundation for a party and is 
important at the origin, but ultimately changes as “competition for votes” and other external 
aspects of a party’s environment take precedence.116 
 Scholars Erikson and Romero also agree with Ware that over time, parties start to adopt 
similar stances on key political issues, thus shifting their ideology to make room for public 
opinion.117 Erikson and Romero create a “general model of candidate equilibrium”, which 
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questions.118 Knowing theoretically that this position exists, gives merit to the idea that parties 
can change their ideology to a more medium position and be better able to compete for votes. 
Even if parties are never able to achieve the exact “optimal position”, it may still be worth it for 
parties to try. Thus, it is important to include party ideology and vote competition theory into the 
framework for this thesis. If these theories supposedly apply to all political parties, then parties 
should act and use the same methodology to campaign and attract voters at both levels of 
government. However, if this is not the case, and rhetoric is different at the two levels, then 
something else, like nationalism, is more likely to dictate the difference. Relating this theory to 
the Pakistani case, we would expect to see that Islamic parties over time lose their loyalty to an 
ideology to more effectively compete for votes at both the national and sub-national levels. 
However, I argue that this only happens at the sub-national level, where ethnic issues are more 
salient and because Islam is still needed at the national level to create a national identity.   
Participation Theory 	   	  	   The previous section on party ideology makes it necessary to understand voter behavior 
and what makes certain voter participation more likely than others, because this will dictate the 
“optimal candidate positions”.119 This is the case because it is important to know whom these 
parties are competing for and what influences these voters. Sidney Verba defines participation as 
“the process by which citizens influence or control those who make major decisions affecting 
them”.120 He then makes this definition more specific and identifies the factors that predict 
participation, which include: “resources”, “motivations”, and other external factors in a voter’s 
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environment.121 This theory about the overall power that voters have within a political system 
suggests that when combined with voter competition and party ideology theory, parties are 
controlled by the participants within a political system and not by party leadership. The next 
question, then, is whether or not participation changes at the national-versus sub-national levels, 
as well as if the actions that national level candidates need to be competitive are the same as 
those for sub-national level candidates. Verba starts to answer this question by theorizing, 
“participation is not limited to any particular government level.”122 He notes that the real 
difference between the types of participation is the extent to which these candidates and officials 
are available and open to their constituents as well as the amount of decision-making power they 
have.123 This establishes that theoretically there will be differences in participation between the 
two levels, which correspond to how close or far the candidates are from voters. I will apply this 
theory to Pakistan then, because each province is home to ethnically diverse constituents with 
differences in geography, wealth, ethnic conflict, and access to resources. Therefore, their 
political leaders will use rhetoric that specifically applies to those groups in order to effectively 
compete for votes.   
Argument 	  
Based on the above literature on nationalism and ethnic groups in Pakistan, I argue that at 
the national level, there is a reliance on Islamic rhetoric to create a national identity for the 
country. I use Gellner’s notion of “negative” nationalism to show how provincial unity before 
partition could not be maintained after.124 Tudor expands on this idea and writes that the Muslim 
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League’s basis for nationalism was negative in the sense that it was defined “in opposition to the 
colonial regime.”125 Jinnah and the Muslim League united the provinces together based on a 
common fear of increased centralization that the Congress was trying to establish after 
independence.126 Therefore, once partition happened and the provinces were not under colonial 
or Congress control anymore, the Muslim League’s negative nationalism was no longer 
sufficient. There was a hole left that had to be filled to try and create one cohesive nation. This 
was not the case for India, because the Congress had established a “programmatic nationalism” 
that was based on common “economic and social principles,” and not just anti-colonialism 
sentiment.127 Therefore, because negative nationalism is not as salient and could not be 
continued post-independence, the Pakistani national Government had to try and overcome the 
continued provincialism in Pakistan to create a national identity. I argue that one way the 
national level does this is through an extensive use of Islamic rhetoric when speaking to its 
citizens.128 In addition, I argue that Islamic rhetoric is not used as extensively at the sub-national 
level. Instead, politicians use secular rhetoric regarding provincial issues when speaking to their 
constituents. From this, I believe that the ethnic conflicts and distinct national identities in these 
provinces will instead make up most of the rhetoric used by provincial leaders, because they 
want to appeal to voters and compete for votes. 129 
In summary, my arguments are:  
A1: To to create a national identity, the Pakistani central Government must rely on the 
use of Islamic rhetoric 
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A2: At the sub-national level, Islamic ideology is not as important because of the strength 
of ethnic nationalism  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  
Negative Nationalism Provincialism  Islamic Rhetoric	  
Pre-Partition  	   Post-Partition Result	  
Figure 1: Causal Diagram for A1 
Secular Rhetoric	  Ethnic Conflict	  Ethnic Nationalism	  
Figure 2: Causal Diagram for A2 
Pre-Partition	   Post-Partition	   Result	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Methodology and Case Selection 	  
Case Selection Process-Provinces 	  
 This section will outline the criteria I used to pick which provinces in Pakistan would be 
the focus for my thesis.  Today there are four provinces in Pakistan: Sindh, the North West 
Frontier Province (or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Balochistan, Punjab.130 Azad Kashmir is also a 
region in Pakistan, but is a “semi-autonomous” state and therefore will not be looked at in this 
study.131  To narrow down the research involved, it was necessary to pick two provinces in 
Pakistan, which would be the focus for my evidence. I chose Punjab because of the 
“Punjabization” that occurred post-partition in Pakistan and because its citizens make up most of 
the Government workforce.132 Because of this connection between the national level and Punjab, 
if there is a difference in the use of Islamic rhetoric by political leaders at the two levels, then I 
will be able to make a significant conclusion and apply that to the other provinces as well. I also 
chose Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) to contrast Punjab with a province and ethnic group that does 
not make up a significant portion of the Government or army, but still has a comparable 
population.133 Below are tables showing provincial population numbers from the 2017 census as 
well as the results from the 2013 general election to the national and provincial assemblies. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, 16-32. 
131 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 183.  
132 Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, 16-18. 
133 Christopher O. Hurst,  “Pakistan’s Ethnic Divide,” 186-187.  
	   Chafin 27 
Table 1. Provincial Population Statistics from the 2017 Census134 
Administrative Unit Total Population 
Pakistan 207, 774, 520 
Punjab 110, 012, 442 
Sindh 47, 886, 051 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 30, 523, 371 
Balochistan 12, 344, 408 
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Table 2. 2013 General Election Results135 
 
Party 
 
National 
Provincial 
Punjab KP Sindh Balochistan 
PML-N 184 295 17 6 17 
PPP 42 6 4 89 0 
PTI 30 26 46 4 0 
MQM 23 0 0 48 0 
JUI-F 13 1 16 0 8 
PML-F 5 0 0 10 0 
JI 4 1 8 0 0 
PkMAP 3 0 0 0 14 
NPP 3 0 0 2 0 
PML-Q 2 8 0 1 6 
ANP 1 0 4 0 1 
BNP 1 0 0 0 2 
QWP-S 1 0 10 0 0 
NP 1 0 0 0 10 	  
Case Selection Process-Political Parties 	  
 The case selection process for the political parties was based off of Haroon Ullah’s 
classification of parties in Pakistan.136 Therefore, the partyies chosen had to be classified as an 	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Islamic party by Ullah and also have deep historical roots in each of the provinces and at the 
national level. I thought it would be useful to conduct my analysis using parties mentioned by 
Haroon Ullah in order to be consistent with existing research examining Islamic ideology in 
Pakistan.137 There are also two main types of Islamic parties that Ullah identifies, which are 
Muslim Democratic and Islamist. Because of this, I chose to pick one of each: PML-N and JI.138 
As seen from table 2., both of these parties have provincial strongholds. However, because their 
strongholds are different from one another, I will be able to compare their rhetoric, regardless of 
whatever provincial ties they may have to the region.  
Corpus Analysis Methodology 	  
To provide evidence for my arguments, I will use both critical discourse analysis (CDA) and 
corpus analysis to examine primary texts from Islamic political parties in Pakistan.139 Authors, 
Samaie and Malmir used these two techniques to analyze the media’s use of the terms Islam and 
Muslim.140 They define the methodology as “a textually oriented interdisciplinary approach to 
the study of social problems which have a semiotic and discursive dimension.”141 In addition, 
Paul Baker wrote a seminal work on this methodology where he explains that a corpus analysis is 
a quantitative and electronic way to study discourse.142 One of the first steps in this type of 
analysis is to create corpora, which Baker defines as “large bodies of naturally occurring 	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language data stored on computers.”143 Baker establishes one issue with this type of analysis, 
which is that online corpora get rid of the context that regular textual analysis provides.144 
However, Baker also states that this issue can be minimalized if a researcher actually compiles 
the corpus themselves, which is what I have done for my research.145 This is the best 
methodology for me to use because it decreases the amount of bias that usually comes from 
researchers cherry-picking texts to analyze.146 In addition to a corpus analysis, I will also conduct 
a close textual analysis on select documents later in this thesis. I do this to try and capture some 
of the context that Baker emphasizes is so important to fully understanding a topic.147 
 To apply this methodology and begin the first steps of compiling my corpus, I first had to 
choose a type of linguistic software to manage it.  I chose Sketch Engine after understanding the 
differences between the many types of software available.148 Via Sketch Engine, I was able to 
extract 820 different news articles from the online Pakistani newspaper, Dawn.149 Just like 
Samaie and Malmir, I chose to not narrow my search on Dawn by typing in specific search 
terms, in order to not create a bias in the documents that Sketch Engine was able to extract.150 I 
chose Dawn to be the source for the news articles mainly because it is one of the only English 
newspapers in Pakistan and has been around for the longest period of time.151 This does present 
an unavoidable bias in that the audiences that a fully English newspaper caters to are different 
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than that of a paper in Urdu. However, this bias could not be avoided due to my inability to read 
Urdu or find reliable translations.  
 From the corpus compilation, Sketch Engine was able to create a list of the most frequent 
words found in all the documents that are associated with either “ideological” or “secular” 
rhetoric.152 This created a dictionary of terms that I could then use to perform a traditional, more 
qualitative textual analysis. I used the most commonly associated words to distinguish between 
the types of rhetoric that the specific leaders within the parties and provinces of my area of 
research were trying to invoke.  
To choose the specific leaders to use in my textual analysis, I went to each party’s or 
provincial Government’s website and determined their leaders in the specific provinces in my 
case study area.153 I then did a broad search for articles in Dawn and pulled the most recent 
articles that each leader had been mentioned in and created separate corpora for each individual. 
Next, Sketch Engine created a simple word list for all of the articles mentioning that leader and 
determined which words were used most often.154 I performed a close textual analysis of one of 
the national leaders, Nawaz Sharif, speeches as well as on one central document. The central 
document for my research is an article written by Asif Luqman Qazi published by the Brookings 
Institute.155 It is one of the only interviews done in English with an Islamic party leader where 
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they explicitly talk about their view of the party and use of Islamic ideology.156 An obvious bias 
exists from the fact that the leader is speaking in English and to a Western audience; however, it 
still provides a good idea of how these parties hope to be portrayed internationally.  
Analysis 
Corpus Dictionary 
  
 To properly distinguish and give meaning to the words found in the Dawn documents, I 
had to establish two sub-categories within the corpus dictionary that I created. These sub-
categories and the terms within them will create the un-biased dictionary of words that will then 
be later used to analyze the specific articles and documents on the leaders of the parties at the 
different levels.  
Sub-Category 1: Ideological  
  The first sub-category that the dictionary is divided into is ideological terms. I chose this 
sub-category because it identifies which other terms are most often associated with ideological 
rhetoric, and from there I will be able to quantitatively understand how many “ideological” terms 
a specific article or text uses in comparison to more “secular” terms. This will allow me to 
establish the overall “theme” of the documents, and compare the use of ideological rhetoric at the 
national and sub-national levels. The central words in this sub-category were “Islam” and 
“ideology,” and I chose these words because Islam captures the religiosity of the ideology that I 
am trying to examine and the term “ideology” itself shows what types of ideology are most used 
by party leaders and in the news/media.  From there, I wanted to capture the closely associated 
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(“collocates”) of the terms in the Dawn corpus.157 Baker explains that “the phenomena of certain 
words frequently occurring next to each other is collocation.”158 The top 15 collocates are listed 
below in Table 3.   
Here I will comment on important “themes” that came out of the frequency list in table 3. 
One interesting point of analysis is that “extremist” and “violent” are the most frequent 
collocates for both Islam and ideology. This has serious implications that even in Pakistan, Islam 
and terrorist/extremist organizations are connected with a specific religion and therefore 
behavior. This begs the question: how could the international system be expected to understand 
the subtly between terrorists organizations and Islamic political parties given the conflation of 
the terms within Pakistan itself? The other major “theme” of the ideological words is that of 
Islamic teachings/way of life. Words like “tenet,” “principle” and “creed” are associated with 
how Islam should be taught as well as practiced. This is interesting because I would expect more 
explicit references to Allah and other symbols of Islam because those tend to be more universal 
rhetorical items that could be evoked to stir up Islamic nationalist sentiment and pride. 
Collocates of “ideology” are in fact more secular than I would have expected with “religious” 
and “creed” being the only words that could reasonably constitute Islamic rhetoric. Because of 
this, I will focus more on the collocates of “Islam” when I am examining other works and 
corpora for Islamic rhetoric.  
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Table 3. “Ideological” sub-category159  
Rank Collocates of Islam Rank Collocates of Ideology 
1 Extremist 1 Extremist 
2 Teach 2 Violent 
3 Pervade 3 National 
4 Muslims 4 Religious 
5 Idealism 5 Creed 
6 Principle 6 Pakistan 
7 Ideologue 7 Custodian 
8 Tenet 8 Council 
9 Interpretation 9  
10 Cause 10  
11 Spirit 11  
12 Son 12  
13 Conversion 13  
14 Hold 14  
15 Service 15  
 
Sub-Category 2: “Secular” 	   The second category of words in the dictionary will be “secular” and include terms that 
are collocates of the terms “political” and “government.” I chose this sub-category to provide a 
comparison between words/terms that were ideological in nature versus those that were not, but 
still held some political meaning. I chose “political” and “government” to represent these 
because of their representation of Pakistan’s political system, separated from the Islamic 
ideological aspect. The top 15 collocates for “political” and “government” are captured in Table 
4.  
 In comparison with the “ideological” and “secular” frequency tables, there are 
significantly more  “secular” words within the Dawn corpus. Islam plays a major role in 
Pakistani history and nationalism, but in terms of media, culture, and entertainment, I argue that 	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Islam is not a significant aspect. What is also interesting in table 4. is that “religious” comes up 
as a collocate for “political.” This verifies the overlap of religion and politics in Pakistan. 
Finally, both provincial and federal or national levels of governments are represented in the 
frequency list below, showing that both levels of politics matter greatly in terms of news 
coverage and therefore, it makes sense to examine both levels and their use of Islamic rhetoric.  
Table 4. “Secular” sub-category160 
Rank Collocates of Political Rank Collocates of Government 
1 Party 1 Federal 
2 Leader 2 Provincial 
3 Social 3 Punjab 
4 System 4 PML-N 
5 Elite 5 Official 
6 Religious 6 Elect 
7 Economic 7 Civilian 
8 Crisis 8 Afghan 
9 Career 9 Sindh 
10 Leadership 10 Successive 
11 Situation 11 Next 
12 Analyst 12 British 
13 Mainstream 13 PPP 
14 Current 14 New 
15 Prisoner 15 Department 
 
Critical Discourse and Corpus Analysis of Central Document 	  	   The central document for this thesis was the Brookings Institute publication of Asif 
Qazi’s essay, “Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words”.161 As seen in Table 5, only two words out of 
the first 15 most frequent words were actually ideological in nature.162 Throughout the 
document, Qazi does make specific references to Jinnah, the founding of Pakistan, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Ibid.  
161 Asif  L. Qazi, “How to Islamize an Islamic Republic: Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words.” 
162 Ibid.  
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importance of Islamic ideology in shaping the nature of government and life in Pakistan.163 
Qazi’s reference to Jinnah is specifically calling on Pakistan’s history and how it necessitated the 
creation of parties like the JI to remain true to the ideal society that Jinnah envisioned. Qazi 
refutes the idea that Jinnah was as secular as many scholars make him out to be and he provides 
evidence to support his statement.164 Qazi’s article on the JI shows a distinct pattern; he talks 
about JI’s religious ideology in terms of the past, and focuses on more political and secular goals 
for the future of JI.165 Specifically, he cites that the JI is in full support of the implementation of 
the constitution and highlights a current debate in the JI party, which is whether or not the party 
needs to split and have a solely political wing that is focused on winning elections.166 This is an 
important change in JI ideology, and Qazi makes clear that this change is due to a desire to more 
effectively compete for votes and gain more political traction.167 Overall, Qazi’s discussion 
validates the idea that the JI does focus on Islamic ideology in its platform, but ultimately wants 
to be distinguished from extremist groups and become a fully political party that overtime will 
inevitably have to change its adherence to Islamic ideology to achieve greater success. 
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Table 5. Frequency of words in “Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words “168 
Rank Word Frequency Percentage 
1 Pakistan 61 0.194267516 
2 Islam (ic)** 58 0.184713376 
3 Political* 38 0.121019108 
4 Muslim* 21 0.066878981 
5 Constitution* 20 0.063694268 
6 Parties* 17 0.054140127 
7 Organization* 17 0.054140127 
8 Elections* 13 0.041401274 
9 Social* 12 0.038216561 
10 Bangladesh* 10 0.031847134 
11 Faith** 10 0.031847134 
12 Jinnah 10 0.031847134 
13 Government* 10 0.031847134 
14 Members* 9 0.02866242 
15 Structure* 8 0.025477707 
Total   314 1 
*Denotes that the word is classified as “secular”  
** Denotes that the word is classified as “ideological”  
 
Evidence for A1 	  
 To reiterate, my first hypothesis was that at the national level, the consensus within the 
literature is accurate in describing Islam as a political tool used by Islamic parties to create a 
national identity. To test this hypothesis, I had to first choose which leader at the national level 
would be most beneficial for my study. I first decided that a representative from the PML-N 
party would be most apt because up until 2017, Nawaz Sharif had been Prime Minister of 
Pakistan since 2013 and was the leader of the PML-N party.169 This is helpful not only because 
Sharif belongs to one of my case study parties, but also because he has given relatively recent 
speeches that appear in English. Once I had my representative chosen, I went to the Prime 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Ibid.   
169 “Former Prime Minister’s,” Prime Minister’s Office, accessed March 29, 2018. 
http://pmo.gov.pk/former_pms.php. 
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Minister’s official website and looked at all of the transcripts of speeches they had from the 
beginning of Sharif’s term.170 I built a corpus from these, which included 151 speeches and 
messages from 2013-2017.171 To not bias the selection, I did not look at the speeches before 
selecting them, except to make sure they were in English. The only speeches from the website 
not used in the corpora were those in Urdu. Table 6 displays the raw results from the word list 
that Sketch Engine created from my corpora.172 These results will be used later to perform 
comparative analysis with the sub-national level.  	  
Table 6. Word List from Nawaz Sharif of PML-N173 
Ideological Frequency Secular Frequency 
Allah 58 Economic 261 
Islamic 48 Development 257 
Religious 44 Government 232 
Religion 39 Country 216 
Islam 28 National 175 
Faith 28 Security 164 
God 16 International 145 
Eid 16 Government 126 
Blessed 15 Investment 98 
Blessings 8 Trade 91 
Holy 8 Political 88 
Prayers 7 Economy 88 
Religions 7 Education 73 
Grace 6 Infrastructure 73 
Bless 5 Policy 72 
 Total 333 (13.4%)  
2,159 (86.7%) 	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 “Prime Minister’s Speeches,” Prime Minister’s Office, accessed March 29, 2018.  
http://pmo.gov.pk/pm_speeches.php. 
171 Ibid.  
172 “Sketch Engine: Language Corpus Management and Query System,” Sketch Engine. 
173 “Prime Minister’s Speeches,” Prime Minister’s Office. 
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Close Textual Analysis for A1 
 
 From the 151 documents used to create the corpora that resulted in the data shown in 
Table 6, I chose to conduct a textual analysis on one of Nawaz’s speeches. The one I chose was a 
speech given directly to his citizens on Pakistan’s Independence in August 2013.174 I chose this 
document because it was one of the only ones in which Sharif is directly speaking to his 
constituents, the rest are mainly focused on Sharif’s speeches to the international community, 
and, more specifically most are concerned with business and finance.175  
 In Sharif’s address to Pakistan on Independence Day, “God” is used five times which 
accounts for a significant amount of the times that “God” is used in all 151 documents in the 
corpus. Sharif focuses on the founders of Pakistan in this speech, but also reminds his citizens 
that all of it was due to God’s generosity.176 The two instances in which Sharif relies on Islamic 
rhetoric are the times that he thanks and attributes Pakistan’s prosperity to God, and at the very 
end when he says “Insha’Allah.”177 Nowhere within the speech does Sharif talk about the 
necessity of maintaining Pakistan’s deep religious routes or the validity of intertwining the 
Government with Islam.178 Because of the context provided by this speech, it becomes apparent 
that at least in this speech, Sharif was superficially evoking the terms “God” and “Allah” to hark 
on the national identity that tries to bind the citizens of Pakistan together.  
Evidence for A2 	  
 To collect the necessary evidence to test my second hypothesis, which is whether or not 
Islamic rhetoric is used significantly at the sub-national levels, I decided to examine rhetoric 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Nawaz Sharif,  “Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif’s Address on Independence Day of Pakistan,” Prime 
Minister’s Office, last modified August 14, 2013, http://pmo.gov.pk/pm_speech_details.php?speech_id=1. 
175 “Prime Minister’s Speeches,” Prime Minister’s Office.  
176 Nawaz Sharif,  “Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif’s Address on Independence Day of Pakistan.” 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
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from specific representatives from each party and from each province. My methodology for 
choosing each leader was mainly dependent on their role within the provincial government, 
specifically chief minister or governor. The JI did not have representatives at the chief minister 
or governor levels within these provinces and therefore I went to the JI’s website to understand 
who their party’s leaders were within these provinces.179 For the PML-N representatives, I found 
that in both provinces the PML-N holds the position of either chief minister or governor, which 
are the top leadership positions in the provinces.180 Once these representatives were chosen, I 
standardized the process for acquiring documents written about their speeches or statements to 
the public. First, I conducted a general search for their name in Dawn.com.181 From there, I went 
through all the documents found in the website and pasted relevant passages into Sketch 
Engine.182 Relevant passages were those that either detailed words or sentiments spoken by the 
leaders or included direct quotes from the representatives themselves. All documents were from 
within the last decade and a total of 112 were found. Once these corpora were constructed, 
Sketch Engine created word lists for each representative.183 From those word lists, I categorized 
relevant words into my two sub-categories (Ideological or Secular) and counted the number of 
times each word was used by the representative. From there, I calculated percentages for how 
much of the most frequent words were either ideological or secular rhetoric. Table 7 listed below 
summarizes the information about the representatives and the corpora built for each one. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 “Provincial Leadership,” Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, accessed March 29, 2018. 
https://jamaat.org/en/provincial_leadership.php. 
180 “Our Chief Ministers,” Punjab Portal, accessed March 29, 2018. 
https://www.punjab.gov.pk/Our_Chief_Ministers; “Government,” Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, accessed 
March 29, 2018. http://kp.gov.pk/page/government.; “Iqbal Zafar Jhagra,” Senate of Pakistan, accessed April 18, 
2018. http://www.senate.gov.pk/en/profile.php?uid=835; “Nawaz Sharif’s Brother Shahbaz Sharif Becomes Interim 
Chief of Ruling PML-N,” Business Standard, last modified February 27, 2018, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/international/nawaz-sharif-s-brother-shahbaz-sharif-becomes-interim-chief-of-ruling-pml-n-
118022700624_1.html.  
181 Dawn, accessed March 29, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/. 
182 “Sketch Engine: Language Corpus Management and Query System,” Sketch Engine. 
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Following that table, tables 8-11 display the results from the word lists created by Sketch 
Engine.184  
Table 7. Representative Corpora Information 
Representative Party Province Position Number of Documents 
Mian Maqsood JI Punjab Party Amir 18 
Shehbaz Sharif PML-N Punjab Chief Minister 18 
Mushtaq Ahmad Khan JI KPK Party Amir and Senator 39 
Iqbal Zafar Jhagra PML-N KPK Governor 37 
 	  
Table 8. Word List for KPK PML-N Representative: Iqbal Zafar Jhagra185	  
Ideological Frequency Secular Frequency 
 0 Government 
41 
  People 
33 
  Education 
31 
  Nation 
26 
  Development 
22 
  Party 
14 
  Political 
14 
  University 
14 
  Peace 
14 
  Tribal 13 
  Terrorism 12 
  Province 12 
  Security 9 
  Educational 9 
  Afghanistan 9 
Total 0 (0%)  
273 (100%) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Ibid.  
185 Dawn, accessed March 29, 2018. https://www.dawn.com/. For each party leader, Dawn was used as a database to 
find articles and quotes regarding their rhetoric. Specific documents were not used, but instead they formed corpora 
to then be linguistically analyzed by Sketch Engine.  
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Table 9. Word List for Punjab PML-N Representative: Shehbaz Sharif186	  
Ideological Frequency Secular Frequency 
  Government 
17 
  Country 
15 
  Electricity 
12 
  Party 
10 
  Provincial 
8 
  Education 
8 
  Corruption 
7 
  Province 
5 
  National 
5 
  International 
5 
  Terrorism 
5 
  Policies 
5 
  Federal 
5 
 Total 0 (0%)  
107 (100%) 
 
Table 10. Word List for KPK JI Representative: Mushtaq Ahmad Khan187	  
Ideological Frequency Secular Frequency 
Islamic 6 Government 69 
  Provincial 
47 
  Party  
37 
  Federal 
26 
  Province 
15 
  Elections 
15 
  Tribal 
15 
  Corruption 
14 
  Parties  
13 
  Alliance 
12 
  Country 
11 
  Party’s 
11 
  System 
10 
  Political 
10 
  Youth 
6 
 Total 6  (1.89%)  
311 (98.11%) 	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Table 11. Word List for Punjab JI representative: Mian Maqsood188	  
Ideological Frequency Secular Frequency 
  Government 
17 
  Provincial 
6 
  Youth 
5 
  Party 
5 
  Youths 
7 
 Total 0 (0%)  
40 (100%) 
Conclusion 
Comparison 	    	   In this section, I will reflect and compare the data from tables 6-11. There are four 
significant themes from this data: “international”, “economic”, “corruption”, and “youth.” The 
use of the term “international” by the above representatives is interesting because it is only 
included in Nawaz and Shehbaz Sharif’s frequency lists. Shehbaz Sharif is Nawaz’s Sharif’s 
brother and is currently acting as the head of the PML-N, while his brother had to resign as 
prime minister after the Panama Papers leak.189 It makes sense that Nawaz Sharif referenced or 
addressed the international community while he was prime minister, because of his status as a 
national level representative. What is more unique is Shehbaz Sharif’s use of the term, because 
none of the other provincial leaders, even within the same party, made a similar reference, or at 
least not as frequently. This validates the literature previously mentioned about the large 
numbers of Punjabis that work in the Government as well as the “Punjabization” of Pakistan that 
happened after partition.190 The fact that this similarity exists makes sense with how linked 
Punjab and the national Government are. However, it does raise the question: why is Islamic 
rhetoric so different between the national level and Punjab, especially given that the two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Ibid.  
189 “Nawaz Sharif’s Brother Shahbaz Sharif Becomes Interim Chief of Ruling PML-N,” Business Standard.  
190 Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?,16-18.  
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representatives are brothers and from the same party? This is where my argument fills the gap in 
the literature, and explains that the reason for this has to do with the national level and its use of 
Islamic rhetoric to create a national identity, which is not required of the provincial level. 
The second theme has to do with the economy and is important because Nawaz Sharif 
only uses it at the national level. The first word in Nawaz Sharif’s frequency list was 
“economic”, whereas “government” was first for all four of the provincial leaders, regardless of 
province or party. Nawaz Sharif also uses the terms “trade” and “investment”, which also fall 
into this theme. On the other side, the third theme is “corruption”, which is more heavily used by 
the provincial leaders versus Nawaz Sharif. These differences in terminology and rhetoric 
illustrate which issues these leaders assess as being the most important for their constituents or 
other audiences, such as the international community. This is important to note because even 
though Nawaz Sharif speaks to the international and business communities, he still also heavily 
relies on Islamic rhetoric in a way that is very different from the provincial levels use of Islamic 
rhetoric.  
The final theme is “youth.” This theme is unique because only the JI representatives use 
it. This is a clear similarity in party rhetoric that does not depend on which province the 
candidate is from. Asif Luqman Qazi, whose essay I reviewed earlier, actually outlines the JI’s 
plan for attracting more youth into the party.191 He mentions this when he talks about how the 
party is experimenting with trying to relax its membership to be able to appeal to a wider group 
of people, and specifically states that the party is focusing on its social media platforms to reach 
out to the youth in Pakistan.192 It is interesting to see the direct correlation between what a leader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Asif  L. Qazi, “How to Islamize an Islamic Republic: Jamaat-e-Islami In Its Own Words.” 
192 Ibid.  
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of the JI is saying that the party is trying to do and then find evidence that they are actually in 
fact focusing on that party-wide with the specific use of rhetoric.  
Results 	   My first argument was that Islamic rhetoric would be evoked more at the national level in 
the form of a political tool than at the sub-national level. 89.5% of the most frequent rhetoric in 
all of the speeches was secular, while 10.5% was ideological. However, of that ideological 
rhetoric, 98.2% of it came from Nawaz Sharif. Thus, leaving the sub-national level accounting 
for only 1.8% of the ideological rhetoric used in the total 263 documents collected. Therefore, I 
conclude that my first argument contributes to the literature on Islamic parties in Pakistan by 
quantifying the gap in ideological rhetoric between the two levels. The close textual analysis 
results also fit into the theoretical framework of my thesis, as they showed how different types of 
nationalism at the national and sub-national levels necessitate different uses of rhetoric. Those 
more nuanced ideas and use of rhetoric can only be captured and parsed with close textual 
analysis because it involves context as well as interpretation. From reading the documents, it was 
clear to see where and why Islamic rhetoric came up, depending on which issues the leaders 
were talking about; thereby showing how political Islam is used as a tool for creating a national 
identity at the national level.  
 From the results of my thesis, it seems clear that theory on the competition for votes 
contributes to the sub-national level results where parties start to become uniform so they can 
stimulate voter participation and electoral success by relying on ethnic nationalism. However, 
this is different at the national level where the candidates have to try and unite many groups of 
people, often without much of an identity rooted in either culture or language. However, an 
important note to make is that ideological rhetoric at any of the levels was not as prevalent as I 
expected. I believe there is a tendency to conflate Islam and Pakistan as being mutually 
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exclusive; however, just as Islamic parties are not all the same, Pakistan is much more than its 
religion and its political leaders illuminate that point. These results also show that my second 
hypothesis was accurate in the sense that Islamic rhetoric was not used as heavily at the sub-
national level. However, there were some interesting findings about the use of Islam between 
parties as well as across provinces, specifically that the JI was slightly more ideological in its 
rhetoric in comparison to both of the PML-N representatives.   
Counter-Arguments  	  
 Critical arguments against my hypothesis and results come from potential case selection 
bias. There is a valid argument for including all four provinces into this case study as well as 
other political parties. This would be useful in testing the robustness of my argument and 
confirming that ideological rhetoric is also used more at the national level in comparison to the 
Sindh and Balochistan provinces. While this expansion would increase the accuracy of my 
thesis, I do not believe it currently limits the results or conclusions of my work. KP and Punjab 
again account for a significant amount of the population and therefore ethnic groups within 
Pakistan. The JI and PML-N are well known political parties in Pakistan, regardless of the 
amount of success they garner. I believe that both parts of these case selections are a good 
starting point for research into how Islam is used differently at the two levels, but agree that a 
more inclusive study could be done to determine more nuance within the results.  
 The Western bias within this thesis should also be acknowledged. The newspaper outlets 
and think tanks chosen for this study are both geared towards a Western audience because they 
are published in English. Therefore, there could be differences in the type of rhetoric used in 
Urdu versus that used in English.  
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Further Research 	  	   I have identified at least two areas for further research on this topic. One potential 
question has to do with how Islamic rhetoric has changed over time in Pakistan. Now that the 
relationship between Islamic rhetoric and the two levels has been identified, it would be 
interesting to test this theory across time, specifically during the historical periods mentioned in 
the literature review of this thesis. The other question addresses Jaffrelot’s argument regarding 
whether or not Pakistan’s “nationalism” is centered on Islam or anti-India sentiment.193 Using the 
same corpus methodology, these two types of rhetoric could be pulled from the speeches and 
articles to see how prevalent they are within the discourse.  
Concluding Thoughts   
 
From the rhetoric and news samples collected, it is clear to see that Islam is conflated 
either with Pakistan as a whole or extremism. My thesis builds off of the literature that is trying 
to dig deep into the complexities of Pakistan and Islam to dispel these broad generalizations.194 I 
use scholarship on nationalism to explain the differences in rhetoric at the national and sub-
national levels in Pakistan, while also recognizing that nationalism is not the sole cause for any 
one facet of Pakistani complexity. By combining linguistic methodology with political science 
analysis, I was able to parse through text and provide conclusions. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed 
state, a key actor in the fight against terrorism, as well as an ally to both the United States and 
China. For these reasons, it is important to understand the motivations behind Pakistan’s political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Christophe Jaffrelot, introduction to Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?, 38. 
194 Some of this literature includes: Saadia Toor, The State of Islam  : Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan; 
Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan; Christophe 
Jaffrelot, introduction to Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?; Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the 
Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan; Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A 
Comparative and Historical Perspective; Haroon K. Ullah, Vying for Allah’s Vote  : Understanding Islamic Parties, 
Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan.  
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actions and rhetoric in order to reduce the conflations that already exist. Most research has 
focused on either Islam at the national level or ethnic conflict at the sub-national level, and my 
thesis was able to bridge the two and explore the links between Islamic nationalism and ethnic 
nationalism in Pakistan. 
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